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SCIENTIFIC and technological advances become irrevocable traits of the 
culture-however drastic the problems of assimilation and adjustment they 
engender, and however disturbing the value choices they pose. This is true 
not only of major advances like Freud's concept of the role of the unconscious 
in human behavior but also of less seminal developments like the drug- 
induced interview (narcoanalysis),' which has become an implement of 
psychiatry and with which we are here concerned. Our goal is to further 
understanding of the proper conditions and limitations of its use, and of its 
potentialities for abuse. We attempt to appraise narcoanalysis from three 
points of view: (1) What is it; (2) Under what conditions, if any, will its 
use (voluntary and involuntary) promote the best interests of the community 
(which is to say, of all individuals); and (3) How adequate is existing law 
to facilitate its appropriate use and discourage its misuse? 
This inquiry is occasioned by the fact that the potentialities of narcoanalysis 
are as tempting to the police investigator, the medical expert, and the 
person accused 2 who reaches desperately for a way of corroborating the 
truth of his testimony, as they are disturbing in their threat to the self- 
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1. While we have adopted the term narcoanalysis, the procedure is also referred to by 
such terms as narcosynthesis, narcohypnosis, or pharmacohypnosis, all indicating a state 
of partial consciousness induced by drugs and an interview with the patient in this condition. 
2. The problem to which this article is addressed is not confined to the field of 
"criminal" investigation proper. The "accused" in the world of today (meaning one threatened with severe negative sanctions which in fact are "punitive" in character) 
increasingly faces the possibility that he may be moved against in any one of a host of 
executive or administrative proceedings aimed at curtailing his privilege of participation in the life of the community, or in a legislative investigatory proceeding, as well as in 
a traditional "criminal" proceeding. 
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determination and privacy of the individual. This is a problem which, as we shall 
see from the precedents to be examined in this article, is already with us to 
the point of urgency. It has also come to be so recognized abroad. A recent 
European episode illustrates one of the more common forms it may assume. 
In 1948, Raymond Cens was on trial by a French Court for collaboration 
with Nazi occupation forces. He claimed to have suffered an apoplectic 
stroke which rendered him incapable of remembering and using verbal expres- 
sions-a condition commonly referred to as aphasia. The court appointed 
a board of eminent psychiatrists to examine him. In conducting their examina- 
tion, the psychiatrists, without express objection by Cens, administered sodium 
pentothal. While under the drug, Cens gave distinct answers to the questions 
propounded. The psychiatrists were permitted, over vigorous objection, to 
testify at the trial regarding the results of the test and to express an opinion 
that Cens' memory was unimpaired and his aphasia feigned. Cens was con- 
victed. Thereafter he brought a suit against the psychiatrists, charging them 
with assault and battery, illegal search, and violation of professional secrets. 
In deciding in favor of the psychiatrists, the court emphasized that they had 
only employed routine psychiatric procedures necessary to answer the limited 
question put to them by the court, namely, whether or not Cens was malinger- 
ing. 
The Cens case provoked widespread discussion throughout Europe and 
prompted the Paris Bar Association to adopt a resolution opposing the use 
of drugs during interrogation. The Association criticized the psychiatrists on 
four grounds: (1) Violating the article of the Penal Code binding doctors to 
professional secrets; (2) Violating the provision forbidding the questioning 
of an accused outside the presence of his advisers; (3) Violating the article 
forbidding assault and battery; and (4) Artificially depriving the defendant 
of his free will.3 
The contradictory views provoked by this case seem to have stemmed from 
misapprehensions concerning the legal and psychological implications of narco- 
analysis as well as from the conflicting value systems of the participants. In 
any event the Cens case suggests a host of medical and legal problems, prob- 
lems which pose a difficult and complex challenge for American criminologists. 
MEDICAL ASPECTS OF NARCOANALYSIS 
The use of pharmacological agents as aids in the study of personality 
structure is neither new nor unique to psychiatry. The Greeks and Romans 
3. The Resolution of the Council of the Bar Association of Paris is set out in 39 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 665 (1949). The Cens case is discussed in Gagnieur, The 
Judicial Use of Psychonarcosis in France, 40 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 370 (1949); 
,and Muehlberger, Interrogation Under Drug Influence, 42 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
513, 527 (1951). 
Following this case, the Egyptian delegate to the United Nations offered a resolution 
to include a prohibition against the use of "truth serums" in the draft covenant on 
Human Rights. His attempt was unsuccessful. N.Y. Times, April 1, 1950, p. 3, col. 1. 
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knew that in vino veritas; and before them many primitive groups were 
familiar with the self-revelation which followed the ingestion of drugs like 
peyote, opium, canabis, and henbane. The chief claim that medical psychology 
can make is that it has been attempting to use scientific methodology to observe 
and understand the behavior of individuals under the influence of drugs. 
In developing his investigative and therapeutic skills, the medical psycholo- 
gist has shifted his interest from the purely physiological aspects of human 
behavior to those psychological areas which can be investigated primarily 
by means of verbal communication with his patient. This trend is illustrated 
in his use of drugs. Formerly utilized as a form of biochemical therapy, they 
are presently employed to induce physiological alterations as a means for 
modifying behavior through verbal psychotherapeutic efforts. Such drugs as 
scopolamine and the barbiturates (sodium pentothol and sodium amytal) have 
been administered in an effort to alter the metabolism of the central nervous 
system and the psychological adjustment of the patient. Since barbiturates 
are relatively non-toxic and produce fewer unsatisfactory side effects than 
scopolamine, they have recently been used with greater frequency. They act 
as a central nervous system depressant, primarily on the cerebral cortex- 
the highest level of the nervous system-and on the diencephalon or "between- 
brain," and their pathways. Referred to in the popular press as "truth- 
serum," the drug used is not a serum and, as will appear, people do not 
always tell the "truth" under its influence. Nor does an understanding of 
the pharmacological action of the drug itself explain its mechanism of action 
in any given case. The particular type of behavior manifested under the 
influence of amytal is a complex resultant of the interaction of the personality 
of the subject, his specific physiological and bio-chemical reaction to it, and 
what is happening to him at the time. 
Hypotheses concerning the mechanism of action of these drugs generally 
stress the diminution of fear and anxiety, the decreased "pressure upon the 
ego," the opportunity for abreaction, the process of talking about and "re- 
living" the foci of emotional disturbance. Early studies disclosed that by using 
barbiturates verbal responses could be elicited from previously non-communi- 
cative catatonic patients.4 During World War II, medical officers effectively 
used barbiturates to speed psychotherapy in a large number of cases of combat 
neurosis.5 Similar reports emanate from Korea. And a recent study empha- 
sizes the opportunity provided in a permissive milieu for relearning socially 
desirable habits while the fear mechanism is weakened by drugs.6 However, 
theories concerning the mechanism of action which are applicable to psycho- 
therapy are not necessarily relevant to legal investigation, where the role and 
4. Bleckwenn, Narcosis as Therapy in Neuropsychiatric Conditions, 15 A.M.A.J. 
1168 (1930); Lindemann, Psychopathological Effect of Sodium Amytal, 28 PROC. SOC'Y 
EXPER. BIOL. & MED. 601 (1943). 
5. GRINKER & SPIEGEL, MEN UNDER STRESS (1945). 
6. DOLLARD & MIT.LR, PERSONALITY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY (1950). 
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goal of the interrogator may be quite different and the subject's psychological 
"set" (or attitude) and responses correspondingly affected. 
The first reported attempt to use drugs in criminal interrogation stemmed 
from observations of a mild type of anesthesia known as "twilight sleep" used 
in obstetrical practice. In 1922, Dr. Robert House, a Texas physician who 
had used scopolamine as an anesthetic in obstetrical cases and had observed 
that women frequently made extremely candid and uninhibited statements, 
injected this drug into two convicted criminals in the Dallas County Jail 
and interviewed them. He established to his satisfaction that they were 
innocent.7 
One of the medical authors has employed sodium amytal in investigating 
the personalities of men accused of various civilian and military anti-social 
acts. These subjects ranged, diagnostically, from character disorders and 
neuroses to psychoses. Their acts included mild delinquency as well as 
murder. Rarely could the information obtained under the influence of the 
drug be interpreted directly in the light of its manifest content. It was useful 
only when integrated into the fabric of the patient's conflictual tendencies and 
anxieties. The verbalized material was valued neither as representative of 
proven deeds nor as demonstrated facts, but simply as psychological data- 
meaningful and helpful only in the context of the clinician's knowledge of 
the patient. 
One study,8 conducted by faculty members of the Yale Department of 
Psychiatry and Yale Law School, attempted to determine whether subjects 
could maintain artificial lies in a sodium amytal interview. Nine subjects 
were selected at random from a volunteer group of university students and 
professional persons. Before drugs were administered the subjects revealed 
shameful and guilt-producing incidents of their past and were then requested 
to invent false self-protective stories about these incidents. Thereafter they 
were given sodium amytal intravenously, and a second experimenter tried 
to prove the falsity of the "cover story" while the subject attempted to main- 
tain his lies. The results, though not definitive, indicated that "normal" indi- 
viduals (i.e., persons who perform adequately in their various functions, have 
good defenses and no highly pathological characteristics) are less likely to 
confess. "Neurotics" are more likely to break down and, what is of equal 
importance, to substitute fantasy for truth. These fantasies were under- 
standable only in the light of an intimate knowledge of the subject's un- 
7. House, The Use of Scopolamine in Criminology, 18 TEX. STATE J. MED. 259 
(1922), reprinted in 2 AM. J. POLCE SCI. 328 (1931). 
Later developments are traced, with extensive citations to the medical literature, in 
Muehlberger, Interrogation Under Drug Influence, 42 J. CaIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 513 
(1951); and Despres, Legal Aspects of Drug Induced Statements, 14 U. OF Cm. L. REV. 
601 (1947). 
8. Redlich, Ravitz, & Dession, Narcoanalysis and Truth, 107 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
586 (1951). 
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conscious processes. Like dreams and day dreams, they tended to have a 
highly symbolic character. It was the neurotic individual, therefore, and 
especially the person with strong feelings of depression, guilt, and anxiety, 
who confessed under sodium amytal. These persons, with strong unconscious, 
self-punitive tendencies (moral masochists, potential and actual depressives) 
not only tended to confess more easily but even to confess to crimes never 
actually committed. 
The obvious and subtle manifestations of the subject's pre-narcoanalysis 
relationship with the doctor remain operative after drugs are given. Besides 
reducing anxiety, the drugs facilitate temporary regression to less mature 
levels of personality integration and identification with the interrogator. This 
may be evidenced by increased suggestibility. However, when the subject is 
resistive the reduction of anxiety and facilitation of regression and identifica- 
tion may be less prominent, especially when the drug is administered by a 
person who might be considered an adversary. 
The conclusions drawn from these two studies are supported by the 
results of other research projects. For example, careful investigation has 
shown that in therapy the psychological processes of repression, dissociation, 
and synthesis operate while the patient is under the influence of drugs.9 
An analysis of confessions obtained during narcoanalysis found that fantasies 
and delusions which frequently could not be distinguished from reality signifi- 
cantly limited the credibility of the statements.l0 A study of malingering 
soldiers found that they persisted in their negativistic attitudes and remained 
uncommunicative while under drugs." 
In summary, experimental and clinical findings indicate that only indi- 
viduals who have conscious and unconscious reasons for doing so are inclined 
to confess and yield to interrogation under drug influence. On the other 
hand, some are able to withhold information and some, especially character 
neurotics, are able to lie. Others are so suggestible they will describe, in 
response to suggestive questioning, behavior which never in fact occurred. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, a drug induced interview may be a valuable 
adjunct to an otherwise thorough psychiatric examination. In some instances 
it may enable a psychiatrist to ascertain more quickly the depth and type of 
mental illness. But drugs are not "truth sera." They lessen inhibitions to 
verbalization and stimulate unrepressed expression not only of fact but of 
fancy and suggestion as well. Thus the material produced is not "truth" in 
the sense that it conforms to empirical fact. Finally, it is most important to 
realize that the conduct of the interrogation and the analysis of its verbal 
9. Kubie & Margolin, The Therapeutic Value of Drugs in Process of Repression, 
Dissociation and Synthesis, 7 PSYCHosoMATIC MED. 147 (1945). 
10. Gerson & Victoroff, Experimental Investigation into the Validity of Confessions 
Obtained under Sodium Ainytal Narcosis, 9 J. CLIN. PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 359 (1949). 
11. Ludwig, Clinical Features and Diagnosis of Malingering in Military Personnel; 
Use of Barbiturates as an Aid in Detection, 5 WAR MED. 379 (1944). 
1953] 319 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.176 on Tue, 28 May 2013 13:35:27 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL 
and behavioral content are exceedingly complex. The results can be evaluated 
properly only by trained and experienced experts who are aware of the manifold 
individual variations in response which occur.12 
FORENSIC ASPECTS OF NARCOANALYSIS 
The preceding section has considered the medical aspects of narcoanalysis 
and has attempted to evaluate the technique in terms of present scientific 
knowledge. The courts make ever-increasing use of the results of scientific 
research and experience. But it is well established that before a scientific 
discovery or technique is entitled to judicial recognition it must have passed 
from the experimental to the demonstrative stage by gaining "general ac- 
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."'3 And, assuming judicial 
recognition of reliability, questions may arise as to limitations upon its use. 
This is particularly true of narcoanalysis. Not only is it necessary to consider 
the reliability of the results but several of the exclusionary rules of evidence 
obtrude and demand attention. But beyond that, the technique sharply raises 
pungent questions of law, science, policy, and professional ethics which spring 
from the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and the statutory 
physician-patient privilege. And as a "brooding omnipresence" is the gradu- 
ally emerging and increasingly challenging problem of the extent to which 
privacy shall be invaded as truth-extracting procedures of high reliability 
are developed. 
From the standpoint of the criminologist, narcoanalysis has the following 
present and potential uses, which are listed here without the expression of any 
value judgment: 
1. As an adjunct useful to a qualified psychiatrist who makes a full ex- 
amination of personality structure for any one of the following purposes: 
(a) Determination of the capacity of an accused to stand trial (present 
sanity), or of the legal responsibility of an accused at the time of the 
alleged criminal act (sanity, irresistible impulse, partial responsibility); 
(b) Determination as to whether a person should be committed to an 
institution for the custody and treatment of the insane or mentally ill; 
(c) Determination as to whether a person should be indefinitely com- 
mitted to either a hospital-type or correctional-type institution under a 
law permitting commitment of "psychopathic," "psychopathic sex," or 
"psychiatrically deviate" offenders; 
12. For a discussion of somewhat similar limitations upon the effectiveness of 
the lie-detector, consult Floch, Limitations of the Lie Detector, 40 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN- 
OLOGY 651 (1950); see also INBAU, LIE DETmTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 29-53 
(1948). 
13. Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
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(d) Estimation of the potentialities of an inmate of a public hospital- 
type or correctional-type institution for the purpose of classification, 
prescribing treatment, or determining parole eligibility; 
(e) Estimation of an individual's loyalty and general security fitness in 
connection with screening procedures for sensitive public positions;14 
(f) Estimation of character whenever this is in issue, i.e., good character 
of an accused in respect of a given relevant trait or good character of a 
witness for truth and veracity; 
(g) Estimation of the potentialities of a convicted offender for the court's 
guidance in sentencing; 
2. As a primary procedure, without an otherwise full examination of person- 
ality structure, when used by a qualified psychiatrist for any of the follow- 
ing purposes: 
(a) To test the veracity of any given material witness by way of corrobora- 
ation, impeachment, or disqualification; 
(b) To extract confessions or admissions of suspected or unsuspected 
crimes, misdeeds, deviational allegiances, indiscretions, or intelligence 
information of any sort; 
(c) To extract other evidence or clues usable against the subject or 
others; 
3. As a primary procedure used by any unqualified person for any of the 
purposes listed under "1" and "2," above; 
4. As a sole procedure, c.g., when the transcript of statements made under 
narcoanalysis is offered in evidence as such for any of the foregoing 
purposes; 
5. As a coercive threat, e.g., where a witness may be deterred from con- 
testing a proceeding or testifying voluntarily because submission to 
narcoanalysis is attached as a condition to his testifying; 
6. As a prevalent and accepted practice, the existence of which may auto- 
matically tend to discredit the testimony of any accused who rejects a 
challenge to submit to narcoanalysis (much as the claim of innocence of 
of an accused who fails to take the stand and testify fully tends to be dis- 
credited today). 
14. During World War II the OSS Assessment School developed a system of pro- 
cedures for revealing the personality structure of OSS recruits. It is not clear whether 
narcoanalysis was included. Donovan & Jones, Program for a Democratic Counter Attack to Communist Penetration of Government Service, 58 YALE L.J. 1211, 1238 (1949). These authors suggest that the President appoint a commission to review the 
loyalty program and examine into the feasibility of using similar techniques in screen- 
ing Government employees. 
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It is apparent that this enumeration of present and possible uses of narco- 
analysis presents problems of law and policy which overlap. Some of the 
problems are new and discrete. Others are facets of older and larger questions 
such as the conditions under which psychiatric evidence, with or without 
narcoanalysis, should be considered by a fact-finder. Although problems 
of the latter sort should be considered in a larger context than narcoanalysis 
alone, the development of this technique has made more acute and pressing 
the need for an appraisal and evaluation of evidential doctrines like the 
opinion rule. For these reasons, the present and potential uses of narco- 
analysis will be discussed under the following broad headings: Voluntary 
narcoanalysis to show insanity; Voluntary narcoanaylsis to establish in- 
nocence; Effect of stipulation upon admissibility; Involuntary narcoanalysis 
to show sanity; Narcoanalysis to establish guilt; and Material witnesses. 
Voluntary Narcoanalysis to Show Insanity 
When a psychiatrist testifies in court as an expert he is required to support 
his opinion by stating the facts upon which it is based. There is a conflict 
whether the data must be elicited from him before he expresses his opinion 
or whether it may be left to the cross-examiner.15 And if his opinion is 
based on a hypothetical question the premises must be derived from facts in 
evidence.16 Narcoanalysis, as has been shown, is frequently a useful diagnostic 
adjunct. Suppose that the defendant's psychiatrist has interviewed him while 
the defendant was under drugs and that the expert's opinion regarding mental 
illness is based in part upon the narcoanalysis. Should he be permitted to 
express his opinion? This problem was presented recently to the New York 
Court of Appeals in People v. Ford.17 
The defendant had been convicted of first degree murder. Neither of the 
two defense psychiatrists believed the defendant legally insane but both 
thought, as did the psychiatrists called by the prosecution, that he was a 
"psychopathic personality." Thus the defense was "partial insanity," i.e., in- 
capacity to premeditate or deliberate. One of the defense psychiatrists had 
interviewed the defendant on three different occasions. He was permitted to 
testify concerning his observations at the first and third interview but not 
the second. At the first interview the defendant had told a rambling and 
incredible story. At the second interview the psychiatrist injected sodium 
amytal and conducted a two-hour examination. The third interview appar- 
ently covered the material gleaned from the second. The trial judge excluded 
testimony regarding the second interview on the ground of lack of precedent. 
On appeal the defendant's conviction was affirmed by a divided court. Since 
15. See cases collected in 2 WIGMORE, VIDENCE ? 675 (3d ed. 1940); 7 id. ? 1922. 
Also see Guttmacher & Weihofen, The Psychiatrist on the Witness Stand, 32 B.U.L. 
REV. 287, 293 (1952). 
16. 2 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE ? 682 (3d ed. 1940). 
17. 304 N.Y. 679, 107 N.E.2d 595 (1952). 
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the majority entered only a per curiam opinion the basis for decision is not 
dear. But from the briefs and the dissent of Judge Desmond, it appears 
that the majority considered the results of drug-induced interviews as insuf- 
ficiently reliable to be admissible in evidence. Judge Desmond attacked this 
assumption as follows: 
"But whether the courts, or the cases, approve of sodium amytal 
testing was not the point at all. This psychiatrist, after showing 
his own qualifications and extensive experience, had described the 
test as a valid one in common use. Having thus established himself 
as one whose opinion was acceptable, he was entitled to give, and 
defendant was entitled to put before the jury, the facts on which 
that opinion was based."18 
The position of this dissent is preferable. Although the material so obtained 
is, without competent interpretation, unreliable, and although even expert 
interpretation without an otherwise complete psychiatric examination (in- 
cluding a comprehensive case history) would be of doubtful value, a psychia- 
trist may be aided in his diagnosis of mental disorder by a drug-induced 
interview. For this reason a properly qualified psychiatrist who has made 
an otherwise full examination of the subject should be permitted to "interpret" 
and "take into account" the results of an interview under drugs in.the process 
of evaluating a defendant's mental condition. Furthermore, when testifying 
as an expert he should be permitted to adduce this material as data upon 
which his opinion is based unless there are other evidential rules that 
exclude. 
Some of the decisions have referred to drug-induced statements as "hearsay 
and self-serving."19 Inasmuch as this assertion is put forth as a conclusion 
without any analysis it is little more than a vituperative epithet concealing 
the more basic objection that the tests have not as yet attained the scientific 
recognition needed to justify the admission of expert testimony based on 
the results of the tests. But the basic objection should be made articulate 
and the hearsay excrescence removed. Not only does the hearsay rationale 
have an unjustifiably obstructive effect in situations such as the Ford case 
where the expert should be permitted to take the test results into account, 
but it may prevent future judicial recognition of new techniques of drug 
administration and examination or of the results of new drugs. 
The "hearsay and self-serving" ritual should be discarded for a number 
of other reasons. First of all, there is no special principle of evidence exclud- 
ing "self-serving" declarations. The only rationale needed or pertinent is the 
18. People v. Ford, 304 N.Y. 679, 681, 107 N.E.2d 595, 596 (1952). Judge Desmond 
also pointed out that the court had recognized the use of sodium amytal in testing in- 
sanity in People v. Esposito, 287 N.Y. 389, 39 N.E.2d 925 (1942), discussed in text at 
note 44 infra. 
19. People v. Cullen, 37 Cal.2d 614, 234 P.2d 1 (1951); People v. McNichol, 100 Cal. 
App.2d 554, 224 P.2d 21 (1950); Orange v. Comm., 191 Va. 324, 61 S.E.2d 267 (1950). 
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hearsay rule and its recognized exceptions.20 But the hearsay rule is not 
applicable in the context of the Ford case. The theory of this rule is that, 
when a statement is offered as evidence of the truth of the matters asserted 
in it, the credibility of the assertor becomes the basis of inference. Thus 
the assertion can be received only when made from the witness stand and 
subject to cross-examination. If, therefore, an extrajudicial statement is 
offered, not as an assertion to evidence the matter asserted, but without 
reference to the truth of what it contains, the hearsay rule is not applicable. 
When an expert testifies as to mental condition the statements made under 
drug influence are not offered assertively but as indicating circumstantially 
the operations of the subject's mind.21 The verbalized material is submitted 
simply as psychological data, data which from a scientific viewpoint are highly 
relevant and proper for the psychiatrist to take into account.22 
If an accused consults a psychiatrist with a view to having him testify as 
an expert regarding the accused's mental condition, the examination may 
include interrogation under drugs. After such an examination the psychiatrist 
may be unwilling to testify as favorably as the defendant desires, so he is not 
called as a witness by the defense. The prosecution then calls the psychiatrist 
as a witness. Aside from professional ethics, is there any reason why the 
expert should not be permitted to testify in behalf of the prosecution? Inas- 
much as the examination was voluntary and since the hearsay rule is inap- 
plicable, a defendant might invoke the physician-patient privilege.23 But this 
20. Hardman, Hearsay: "Self-Serving" Declarations, 52 W. VA. L. REV. 81 (1950). 
21. See 6 WIGMORE, VIDENCE ? 1766 (3d ed. 1940)); 2 id. ? 228. District Judge 
Pollock in United States v. Roberts, 62 F.2d 594, 596 (10th Cir. 1932) elucidates the 
point as follows: "If a man comes into the office of a doctor or a lawyer, and makes 
utterly irrational statements, the fact that he makes the statements is some proof of a 
mental disease. Such statements are not admitted as proof of the facts stated; their 
evidentiary value lies in the fact that they were made. The question is not whether the 
statements are true, but whether they were made. They are not within the hearsay rule." 
In addition to the reason that the lie-detector has not as yet attained scientific accept- 
ance as a reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception, some courts 
point out that the admission of the results of lie-detector tests would interfere with the 
right of cross-examination. State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947); Boeche 
v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949); State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 
N.W. 314 (1933). This rationale overlooks the fact that a lie-detector test merely 
records physiological reactions and that even the "yes" and "no" answers (which may 
be dispensed with without materially affecting the test results) are not used testimonially. 
22. Even if the statements be considered assertive rather than circumstantial in 
character, they can be considered as falling within the hearsay exception for statements 
of a mental condition. 6 WIGMORE, VIDENCE ?? 1715, 1720 (3d ed. 1940). Nor will the 
fact that they are made post litem motam to qualify a psychiatrist as a witness take them 
out of the exception since the post litem motam limitation is not applicable where mental 
condition is in question. United States v. Roberts, 62 F.2d 594 (10th Cir. 1932). And 
see Note, 130 A.L.R. 977 (1941). 
23. Even in a state where there is no statutory privilege the courts may create one 
in favor of psychiatrists. A lower Illinois Court recently did just this. Binder v. Ruvell, 
Civil No. 52C2535, Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Ill., June 24, 1952, 47 N.U.L. REV. 384 
(1952). 
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privilege should not apply. The privilege exists only where the physician 
has been consulted in his professional capacity with a view to curative treat- 
ment. Here he was not consulted for that purpose but to qualify him as a 
witness. Consequently, a number of courts have held that where the physician 
is consulted for purposes of examination and not for treatment, communica- 
tions made to him or information acquired by him from the examination are 
not privileged.24 
Voluntary Narcoanalysis to Establish Innocence. 
Suppose an accused who has voluntarily submitted to an examination under 
drugs desires to offer the results to establish that he is innocent, i.e., that 
he did not commit the act, rather than to show lack of responsibility. Con- 
sidering the present state of scientific knowledge, as developed in the medical 
section of this article, a transcript of the interview should definitely not be 
admissible in evidence. Only the most sanguine of the clinical investigators, 
unaware of the psychological complexities of material produced under the 
influence of drugs, have automatically accepted this material as "truth." 
Furthermore, utterances made while under drugs are frequently thick, 
mumbling, and disconnected. Both judge and jury would be at a loss to 
evaluate the material. Here again, the courts invoke the hearsay rule and 
exclude.25 This is not only unnecessary but delusive. The unreliability of 
the results and the lack of expert interpretation are sufficient reasons for ex- 
clusion. And even should drugs or experimental techniques be developed 
which assure the trustworthiness of drug-induced statements offered as truth, 
the hearsay rule would not inexorably exclude. Indeed, the reason for the 
rule would no longer exist. Although each of the numerous exceptions to 
the hearsay rule rests on some special ground, certain general notions underlie 
them all. One is that some special situation exists which diminishes the 
risk of untrustworthiness to such an extent that cross-examination can safely 
be relinquished.2 In other words, the reliability of the test results becomes, 
by hypothesis, a substitute for the lack of cross-examination. 
Even though the statements made under drugs should not, standing alone, 
be admissible evidence of innocence, should an expert who has made an 
otherwise full examination be permitted to consider the statements and testify 
24. Arnold v. Maryville, 110 Mo. App. 254, 85 S.W. 107 (1905); Note, 52 COL. L. 
REV. 383, 393 (1952); Note, 107 A.L.R. 1495 (1937). 
25. Orange v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 423, 439, 61 S.E.2d 267, 274 (1950) ("The 
answers given by the defendant are at times maudlin and at times obviously self-serving and 
indicative of a conscious purpose to avoid self-incrimination."); People v. McNichol, 100 Cal. App. 2d 554, 558, 224 P.2d 21, 24 (1950) ("And as for the argument that the statements 
made by defendant while in an hypnotic state should in any event be allowed as matter 
of defense though otherwise inadmissible, even assuming that they would have shown a 
denial of the making and passing of checks, they would have constituted but hearsay 
and self-serving declarations, and would not have constituted evidence."). 
26. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE ? 1420 (3d ed. 1940). 
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that it is improbable that the defendant committed the act charged? A defend- 
ant is always entitled to call character witnesses-one traditionally accepted 
method of adducing support for the proposition that he does not have a 
personality structure consistent with the commission of the offense alleged.27 
Psychiatric examination (whether drugs are used or not) is simply another- 
and presumably much more reliable-way of inquiring into personality 
structure for the same purpose. But the few appellate decisions on the point 
have excluded, either on the ground of unreliability or on the ground of hear- 
say.28 On the other hand, a few trial courts have allowed accounts of drug- 
induced examinations to be presented by a defendant's medical witnesses.29 
The same reasons which render the grounds of unreliability and hearsay 
untenable when the expert testifies as to sanity should likewise eliminate them 
as objections when the expert offers to testify as to the personality structure 
of an accused. But, is the opinion rule a bar to admissibility? Two aspects 
of this rule might be raised in objection. A substantial number of courts have 
held that a witness is not permitted to give his opinion upon an "ultimate 
fact in issue." It is said that such testimony "usurps the functions" or 
"invades the province" of the jury. Following this view, it could be argued 
that the testimony of an expert regarding the personality structure of the 
defendant would be an expression of opinion upon the crux of the whole case, 
namely, that the defendant is innocent. But this argument proves too much. 
First of all, the expert is doing no more than any other character witness 
does in a more indirect way. An ordinary character witness may testify to 
the defendant's reputation in connection with the specific trait relating to the 
act charged. From his testimony the jury is expected to infer the defendant's 
disposition for the particular trait. This inference then affords the immediate 
basis of a second inference as to conduct, i.e., the probability or improbability 
that defendant did the act charged. On the other hand, when the expert 
testifies to the defendant's personality structure there is only one inference to 
be drawn, the first being eliminated.30 Nor is the expert attempting to "usurp" 
the jury's function. In fact, he could not do so if he desired. The jury may 
27. 1 WIGMORE, VIDENCE ?? 55, 56 (3d ed. 1940). It should be noted that the 
familiar rules concerning the corroboration or rehabilitation of an impeached witness are 
not being invoked here. Once a defendant as witness may be considered "impeached" as 
to character in the course of trial, that will of course afford an additional ground for 
the admissibility of this type of character evidence. For further elaboration, see section 
in text marked "Material Witnesses," pages 338-41 infra. 
28. People v. Cullen, 37 Cal.2d 614, 234 P.2d 1 (1951) (hearsay); State v. Hudson, 
314 Mo. 599, 289 S.W. 920 (1926) (unreliability); Henderson v. State, 230 P.2d 495 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1951) (unreliability); cf. State v. Pusch, 46 N.W.2d 508 (N. D. 
1951) (results of hypnosis offered by defendant through expert to establish innocence 
excluded). 
29. Muehlberger, Interrogation Under Drug Influence, 42 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMI- 
NOLOGY 513, 524 (1951). 
30. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE ?? 920, 997 (3d ed. 1940). 
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still reject his opinion.31 Furthermore, courts fail to apply the "ultimate 
issue" doctrine with consistency. They disregard it without explanation when 
value, sanity, handwriting, intoxication, and paternity are in issue.32 The 
criterion governing the propriety of expert testimony or of experiments bear- 
ing on a question in issue should be whether or not they might help the 
jury to ascertain the truth, whether the controverted matter be the ultimate 
fact or some minor evidential fact.38 
Another feature of the opinion rule that might be urged against the admis- 
sibility of expert opinion regarding the character of a defendant is the doctrine 
that personal knowledge and belief of a witness to character is inadmissible, 
that community-reputation is all that will be received. This limitation upon 
the use of character evidence should be abandoned for a number of reasons. 
It is contrary to the orthodox practice of the common law and has been 
vigorously condemned by most commentators.34 And some courts have 
departed from it, as will be shown, in the analogous situation where an attempt 
is made to impeach the character of a witness by admitting expert evaluation 
of a witness' character for veracity. There is no reason why a corresponding 
relaxation should not be recognized when, through experts, an accused invokes 
his own good character to evidence the improbability that he committed the 
act charged. 
Effect of Stipulation Upon Admissibility 
Suppose that the defense and prosecution enter into a stipulation that the 
defendant shall undergo examination, including narcoanalysis, by a designated 
psychiatrist, and that the results shall be admitted in evidence without objec- 
tion on the part of the party adversely affected. The question of admissibility 
presented is similar to that which has arisen with respect to lie-detectors. The 
results of lie-detector tests have usually been admitted in civil cases by stipula- 
31. The "ultimate issue" doctrine has been exploded by Wigmore, 7 EVIDENCE ?? 1920, 
1921 (3d ed. 1940) and abandoned by the MoDEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 401 (1942). 
The "ultimate issue" doctrine is occasionally mentioned in the lie-detector cases. 
E.g., State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947), where the court, after 
setting out the testimony of the operator which was admitted by the trial court, stated that he was permitted to testify "not merely as to whether, in his opinion, the tests 
indicated, generally, truthfulness or falsification . .. but was permitted to give his 
interpretation of their answers on the essential issue of the case-his answers bearing 
directly upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant." See also INBAU, LIE DETECTION 
AND CRIMINAL INTFRROGATION 86-90 (2d ed. 1948). 
32. McCormick, Some Observations upon the Opinion Rule and Expert Testimony, 23 TEXAS L. REV. 109 (1945). 
33. Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646 (1942) (an 
enlightened opinion adopting this test). And see Notes, 28 IOWA L. REV. 549 (1942), 26 IOWA L. REV. 819 (1941). 
34. 7 WIGMORE, VIDENCE ? 1986 (3d ed. 1940): "So far as practical policy and 
utility is concerned, there ought to be no hestitation between reputation and personal 
knowledge and belief." See also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 306 (1942). 
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tion,85 and by the trial courts in a few criminal cases.38 Very few cases have 
reached the appellate courts, and the results are inconclusive, although favor- 
ing admissibility.37 The only case involving narcoanaylsis is Orange v. Com- 
monwealth,38 a murder prosecution, in which the defendant sought to intro- 
duce the results of a test made pursuant to an agreement with the prosecuting 
attorney. The court held that the results were properly excluded since the 
agreement did not provide that the results of the test would be admissible in 
evidence. If the stipulation or agreement had so provided, the implication 
is that the court would have held them admissible.39 In general, contracts 
to alter or waive established rules of evidence are valid and enforceable in the 
absence of fraud or coercion.40 There seems to be no substantial reason why 
a stipulation for the admissibility of the results of narcoanalysis should not 
be upheld, providing that the accused had the advice of counsel at the time 
of stipulation and that the psychiatric examination was otherwise complete and 
the psychiatrist qualified. 
Involuntary Narcoanalysis to Show Sanity 
Several techniques have been devised for avoiding the "battle of experts" 
in criminal insanity cases. Among them are: (1) appointment of impartial 
experts by the court; (2) commitment of defendants pleading insanity to a 
mental hospital for observation and study by the hospital staff; and (3) 
routine psychiatric examination of all persons charged with certain major 
offenses as provided by the Massachusetts Briggs Law.41 Suppose a defend- 
ant is subjected to one of these procedures; may he lawfully be required to 
submit to narcoanalysis as part of the general psychiatric examination? 
The decisions involving insanity pleas have quite uniformly admitted in 
evidence the results of psychiatric examinations over the claim of a violation 
35. See Note, 30 MICH. B.J. 6 (Feb. 1951). 
36. Inbau, Detection of Deception Technique Admitted as Evidence, 26 J. CrM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 262 (1935); Note, 26 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 758 (1935). 
37. People v. Houser, 85 Cal.App.2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948) (properly admitted 
over defendant's objection); State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947) (court 
implied that if there had been a stipulation the results would have been admissible); 
Le Fevre v. State, 242 Wis. 416, 8 N.W.2d 288 (1943) (excluded, but court failed to 
discuss the effect of the stipulation). The latter case is discussed in Note, [1943] Wis. 
L. REV. 430, 438, and in INBAU, LIE DE1mETION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 92 n.14 
(1948), both authors suggesting that the case is not controlling upon the stipulation 
question. 
38. 191 Va. 423, 61 S.E.2d 267 (1950). 
39. Id. at 439, 61 S.E.2d at 274: "This test was made apparently on the motion of the 
defendant and her co-defendants, and agreed to by the Commonwealth's attorney, but 
with no agreement that the results should be given in evidence." 
40. TRACY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 367 (1952); Note, Contracts to 
Alter the Rules of Evidence, 46 HARV. L. REV. 138 (1932). 
41. Weihofen, Eliminating the Battle of Experts in Criminal Insanity Cases, 48 
MICH. L. REv. 961 (1950). See also Guttmacher & Weihofen, The Psychiatrist on the 
Witness Stand, 32 B.U.L. REV. 287, 306 (1952). 
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of the privilege against self-incrimination. Careful analysis is infrequent, 
the courts being more often influenced by considerations of expediency.42 
However, either one of two theories would support the results reached. First, 
the privilege protects an accused from supplying any testimonial link in the 
chain of evidence necessary to show that he committed the crime in question. 
But it has no application to an investigation of his mental responsibility at the 
time the act was committed. This question does not necessitate an inquiry as to 
guilt or innocence. A psychiatrist may on occasion be able to make a satis- 
factory examination on the issue of mental disease without mentioning the 
crime in question. Of course, if an accused were required to discuss the crime 
itself, then the privilege would probably be applicable since the statements 
made by him would be equivalent to those made under testimonial compulsion.43 
Another theory supporting the admissibility of these psychiatric examina- 
tions is that the accused by interposing the defense of insanity thereby waives 
any immunity he otherwise may have had. This, of course, is broader than 
the first theory. In People v. Esposito,44 the defendants had pleaded insanity 
and the trial judge had committed them to a mental institution for examina- 
tion. As part of their psychiatric examination the defendants were injected 
with metrazol and sodium amytal. The report of the examination disclosed 
that the defendants were sane and that they were malingering. At their 
trial, defendants objected to the testimony of the psychiatrist in so far as it 
was based on the reactions of the defendants while subject to the drugs and 
on information obtained from them while under drug influence; one of the 
defendants' grounds was that their privilege against self-incrimination was 
violated. In approving the admissibility of the testimony of the psychiatrist, 
the New York Court of Appeals discussed the problem as follows: 
"The drugs used were metrazol and sodium amytal. There was 
evidence that those drugs are frequently used in psychiatric ex- 
aminations. We have reached the conclusion after due consideration 
that the injection of those drugs and the receipt of the testimony 
violated no rights of the defendants under the circumstances pre- 
sented by this record. The drugs were administered for the purpose 
of removing defendants' inhibitions because the doctors suspected that they were shamming and malingering. One doctor testified that 
the symptoms exhibited by the defendants did not fit into 'any 
pattern that you know of, any form of psychosis' and that 'they 
[the defendants] are not showing any symptoms of any known 
psychosis.' It must be remembered that the orders for the examina- 
42. INBAU, SELF-INCRIMINATION 52-61 (1950). 
43. It has never been held that the right of a physician or psychiatrist to interview 
a subject under these conditions carries with it any loss of the subject's privilege to refuse 
to answer questions where the answers might tend to incriminate him. Cf. People v. 
Esposito 287 N.Y. 389, 39 N.E.2d 925 (1942), discussed in the next paragraph of the 
text. And see decisions collected in Despres, Legal Aspects of Drug-Induced Statements, 
14 U. OF CHi. L. REV. 601 (1947). 
44. 287 N.Y. 389, 39 N.E.2d 925 (1942). 
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tion and observation were based upon the defendants' claim that 
they should escape punishment by reason of their mental condition 
at the time of the commission of the acts charged or by reason of 
their condition at the time of arraignment and trial. Under those 
circumstances defendants may not both advance their claims and 
then seek to make the rules for the determination of those claims. 
Since they desired to present their claims that they were not legally 
responsible for their acts because of mental defect they were subject 
to the use of methods set up objectively by the medical profession 
for the proper determination of such claims. Courts, under the 
circumstances presented here, may not control the methods which 
have been determined by the medical profession to be proper means 
for discovering or treating mental diseases. 
"As to the claimed violation of constitutional immunity from self- 
crimination, we do not pass upon the question whether testimony of 
the examining and observing psychiatrists was admissible to establish 
a confession of guilt or admissions evidencing guilt while the de- 
fendants were subject to the influence of the drugs which had been 
administered to them. We are not now prepared in view of the 
record presented here and of present medical knowledge and experi- 
mentation disclosed therein, to hold that such testimony is competent. 
The questions asked in this instance were quite evidently for the 
purpose, among others, of determining whether the defendants were 
capable of understanding the proceedings and of making their de- 
fense. Neither confessions of guilt nor admissions evidencing guilt 
were elicited. There was, therefore, no error committed."45 
Nor is the physician-patient privilege applicable. As pointed out before, 
it applies only when the physician has been consulted in his professional capacity 
with a view to curative treatment. For this reason, it is usually held that the 
privilege does not protect statements made to a physician appointed by the 
court 46 or designated by the prosecutor 47 or even to communications made 
to a physician who examined the patient at the request of the patient's 
attorney solely for the purpose of trial.48 
Use of Narcoanalysis to Establish Guilt 
Although courts have not generally admitted lie-detector results in evidence, 
the value of the lie-detector in criminal investigation has been recognized.49 
45. Id. at 397-8, 39 N.E.2d at 928. Cf. People v. Ford, 304 N.Y. 679; 107 N.E.2d 595 
(1952), discussed at pages 322-3 supra. 
46. Simecek v. State, 243 Wis. 439, 10 N.W.2d 161 (1943); Note, 130 A.L.R. 977, 
988 (1941). 
47. State v. Fouquette, 67 Nev. -, 221 P.2d 404 (1950), cett. denied, 341 U.S. 932 
(1951). 
48. City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 
(1951) (although not within physician-patient privilege they were within the attorney- 
client privilege). Also consult Note, 52 COL. L. REV. 383 (1952). 
49. State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 628, 185 P.2d 147, 151 (1947) ("All this is not 
to discredit the lie-detector as an instrument of utility and value. Its usefulness has 
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Some business concerns, such as department stores and banks, use lie-detec- 
tion equipment in examining their employees.50 And certain federal agencies 
have employed the lie-detector to supplement the exacting loyalty investiga- 
tion for men and women involved in "sensitive" jobs related to national 
security.51 Furthermore, some attorneys, before proceeding to build a case, 
now send their clients to private lie-detector operators to check their stories.52 
Similar uses of narcoanalysis are to be expected. The Kansas City Police 
Department, for example, has repeatedly employed narcoanalysis in criminal 
interrogation.53 And one of the most dramatic uses of the technique involved 
William Heirens. At the time of his arrest for an attempted burglary he 
received a blow on the head. It was contended that this injury resulted in 
an amnesia and possibly mental derangement. A board of experts was 
appointed by a court to examine Heirens. Sodium pentothal was administered 
and while under the drug's influence, Heirens not only displayed a clear 
memory but also admitted the commission of three murders and over five 
hundred burglaries. After his recovery the admissions were called to his 
attention, whereupon he made a written confession, pleaded guilty, and was 
given three consecutive life sentences.54 
The most recent report of the successful use of narcoanalysis in criminal 
interrogation is that of Dr. James H. Matthews of the Department of 
Anesthesiology of the University of Minnesota's Medical School. Collaborat- 
ing with the State Department of Protection and Investigation he used a 
combination of pentothal, scopolamine, and morphine on ten subjects. Eight 
been amply demonstrated by detective agencies, police departments and other law- 
enforcement agencies conducting.criminal investigations. It is also being frequently em- 
ployed in matters, other than investigation of crimes. By its use admissions and confes- 
sions are frequently secured, and facts developed which assist in further discoveries.") 
50. Note, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 439, 443 (1951). 
51. N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1951, p. 1, col. 2. 
52. Note, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 439, 443 (1951). 
53. Barkham, Truth Drugs: The New Crime Solver, Coronet, Jan. 1951, p. 29. In the non-forensic field narcoanalysis has been widely used in the treatment of war 
neuroses. Muehlberger, Interrogation under Drug Influence, 42 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI- 
NOLOGY 513, 522 (1941). It has also been effective in identifying victims of an amnesia. 
Mosier & Hames, The Identification of an Amenesia Victim by the Use of Scopolamine 
-An Experiment, 26 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 431 (1935). 
54. The case is discussed in Despres, Legal Aspects of Drug-Induced Statements, 14 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 601 (1947); and Muehlberger, Interrogation under Drug Influence, 
42 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 513, 526 (1951). The psychiatric report is reproduced in 
38 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311 (1947). 
Heirens has recently filed a petition under Illinois' new Post-Conviction Law alleging 
violation of constitution rights. In addition to charging police brutality, he asserts that 
he was given a "truth serum" against his will. Newsweek, Dec. 8, 1952, p. 29, col. 1. A trial court in Iowa recently authorized an examination under drugs to determine which 
of two men was driving a truck that ran over and killed a two-year-old boy. Both men 
agreed to the test. Apparently the results are to be reported to the grand jury. N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 19, 1952, p. 49, col. 7. 
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were under arrest on suspicion of murder, of which three were also suspected 
of, or charged with, sex offenses; the two other subjects were charged with 
armed robbery. The crimes had been committed from 4 days to 28 years 
prior to study. All suspects steadfastly asserted innocence. They had been 
subjected to lie-detector interrogation and, where circumstances permitted, 
had been given psychological evaluation tests. It is interesting to note that 
in every case the conclusions drawn from the lie-detector examinations sub- 
stantiated those later obtained from narcoanalysis. These results were as 
follows: 
"In our series of ten cases confessions of guilt were obtained 
from three. These were fully acknowledged and elaborated upon by 
the subjects the following day. The other seven subjects divulged a 
sufficient amount of new material withheld from previous investiga- 
tors, and conducted themselves in a manner to convince the authori- 
ties of their innocence. In most of these cases subsequent police 
investigation has now substantiated their claim."55 
In view of the inadmissibility of the results of narcoanalysis generally, 
what is the legal status of confessions, admissions, and other evidence ob- 
tained in consequence of its use? This question is highly pertinent, for the 
authorities undoubtedly will continue to experiment with drugs and to use 
them to induce statements with two purposes in mind. First, to uncover 
important clues that will lead to admissible evidence or will convince in- 
vestigators of the guilt or innocence of the suspect and thus narrow the 
investigation.56 Second, to bring about an admission of guilt with which 
the suspect can be confronted and a confession obtained. 
55. Matthews, Narco-Analysis for Criminal Interrogation, 70 THE JOURNAL-LANCET 
(NEW SERuES) 283, 287-8 (1950). The technique of administration and interview is 
described as follows: 
"The technique of questioning varied in each case according to what was known 
about the patient's personality through history and interview, the seriousness of the legal 
charges, the patient's attitude under narco-analysis and his rapport with the investigators. 
In the beginning the questions were directed at establishing the identity of the patient and 
associating him with the scene of the crime and the space of time involved. As the 
desired plane of anesthesia was approached, the questions were more skillfully worded 
and pointed. Key questions were reworded when it was obvious that the patient was 
withholding the truth, and the fact of a given denial was quickly passed over and ignored. 
At times it was necessary to check the facts obtained by reference to the police authorities 
who accompanied the patient, because there was no other way for the examiner to 
distinguish truth from fantasy. Persistent careful questioning reduced the ambiguities, 
but did not eliminate them entirely . . . our patients could sometimes lie and their 
reasoning powers were sometimes present though much distorted. When the examination 
followed many weeks, sometimes years, of intensive questioning and investigation, it was 
much more difficult to evade the defenses. The best results were obtained when the 
narco-analysis occurred early in the investigation, prior to repeated and severe question- 
ing." Id. at 288. See also Lorenz, Criminal Confessions under Narcosis, 31 Wis. MED. J. 
245 (1932). 
56. Muelhberger gives as an example a suspect in a shooting case who may be 
questioned (under drug influence) as follows: 
332 [Vol. 62:315 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.176 on Tue, 28 May 2013 13:35:27 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
DRUG-INDUCED REVELATION 
If a suspect voluntarily submits to narcoanalysis with full knowledge of his 
rights and, when confronted with the results, confesses to a crime, there is 
no legal objection to the use of the confession so obtained if it meets the 
usual requirements.57 A fortiori, evidence resulting from leads obtained under 
voluntary narcoanalysis would be admissible. 
Suppose that a suspect is threatened with narcoanalysis and then makes a 
full confession, perhaps in fear that if he submits additional crimes might be 
disclosed. Or suppose that he is forced to undergo narcoanalysis and confesses 
when confronted with the results (either accurately stated or misrepresented). 
In either case, is the confession admissible in evidence at his trial? The lie- 
detector cases are helpful analogies, but the results there have depended upon 
which one of two competing doctrinal propositions has been applied. On the 
one hand is the rule that a confession obtained by abuse, threats, or objection- 
able promises is inadmissible. On the other hand, the courts have uniformly 
held that a confession obtained by the use of trickery or deception is admis- 
sible providing the trick or deception was not of such a nature as likely to 
produce an untrue confession.58 
"Q. After the shooting, what did you do with the gun? 
"A. I threw it in the river. 
"Q. What river did you throw the gun into? 
"A. The Chicago River. 
"Q. Where did you throw the gun into the Chicago River? 
"A. Off the Halsted Street bridge. 
"Q. Off which side of the Halsted Street bridge did you throw the gun? 
"A. Off the East side." 
He also suggests another advantage of drug induced interviews: "After the proper 
stage of disorientation has been reached, one can bring in a whole group of investigators 
and even informers ('stool pigeons') who are personally known by the subject, and they 
can participate in the interrogation. The subject will recognize them at the time and 
will talk with them. If they are removed before the subject is too far out of the 
scopolamine influence, he will not know that they have been around. This is particularly 
helpful in preserving the usefulness (and health) of informers." Muehlberger, Interro- 
gation Under Drug Influence, 42 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 513, 519-20 (1951). 
57. The lie-detector cases hold that where it appears that the defendant agreed to 
the test, or did not oppose it, and there are no threats or improper inducements, a subse- 
quent confession will be admitted. State v. Collett, 144 Ohio 639, 58 N.E.2d 417 (1944); State v. Dehart, 242 Wis. 562, 8 N.W.2d 360 (1943). 
In People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App.2d 124, 219 P.2d 70 (1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 388 (1951), 41 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 387 (1950), a police officer who had ex- 
amined the defendant on a lie-detector was called as a prosecution witness. He was 
permitted, over defendant's objection, to testify that on informing the defendant that the results were adverse to him the defendant answered, "I cannot explain that." On 
appeal defendant's counsel successfully contended that the results were inadmissible and 
therefore could not be introduced in the guise of an accusatory statement. 58. 3 WIGMoRE, VIDENCE ? 841 (3d ed. 1940); INBAU, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL 
INTERROGATION 175 (2d ed. 1948). However, this well-established rule is rendered un- 
certain in view of the Supreme Court's requirement that "certain decencies of civilized 
conduct" be observed. E.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Cf. Lisenba v. 
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In Pinter v. State,59 the officers taking the defendant to jail discussed the 
lie-detector and referred to its as "a machine that would read your mind." At 
his trial, the defendant claimed that this conversation "scared" him into a 
confession, thus rendering it incompetent because unduly influenced. Although 
there had not been a direct threat of a lie-detector test, the language of the 
Mississippi Supreme Court is broad enough to admit a confession induced 
by such a threat: 
"It would seem that his fear was not of the machine but of its 
capacity to elicit truth. It was therefore a fear of the truth and its 
consequences. A desire to anticipate, by voluntary disclosure, the 
supposed revelations of a 'lie detector' has its origin in the mind and 
conscience of the defendant, and is not an 'undue influence.' "80 
In Commonwealth v. Hipple,61 the defendant had been told when a lie- 
detector was placed upon his arm that "you can lie to us but you cannot lie 
to this machine." Believing that he had betrayed himself, he thereafter con- 
fessed to a murder. The admissibility of the confession was upheld by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Since no promises, force, or threats had been 
employed, the mere use of the instrument did not render the confession 
inadmissible. Furthermore, a "confession procured by a trick or artifice, not 
calculated to produce an untruth, is never vitiated thereby."62 However, 
when a suspect is forcibly subjected to a lie-detector and, while still under 
duress, confesses, the confession will be excluded.63 
Similar results may very well occur when drugs instead of the lie-detector 
are involved. 
If a suspect is subjected to involuntary narcoanalysis, is evidence 
obtained as a result of clues revealed by him admissible evidence or 
California, 314 U.S. 219, 237 (1941) ("If, by fraud, collusion, trickery, and subornation 
of perjury, on the part of those representing the State, the trial of an accused person 
results in his conviction, he has been denied due process of law. The case can stand 
no better if, by the same devices, a confession is procured, and used in the trial.") 
59. 203 Miss. 344, 34 So2d 723 (1948). 
60. Id. at 347, 34 So.2d at 724. See also Note, 39 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 271 
(1948). 
61. 333 Pa. 33, 3 A.2d 353 (1939). 
62. Id. at 39, 3 A.2d at 356; accord, Commonwealth v. Jones, 341 Pa. 541, 19 A.2d 
389 (1941). 
63. In People v. Sims, 395 Ill. 69, 69 N.E.2d 336 (1946), the defendant had refused 
to take a lie-detector test but had been ordered to submit by the prosecuting attorney 
and police investigators. A confession was obtained from her while the lie-detector was 
attached to her body although not in operation. The Illinois Supreme Court held it 
inadmissible. See also People v. Lettrich, 108 N.E.2d 488 (Ill. 1952). 
In Bruner v. People, 113 Colo. 194, 156 P.2d 111 (1945), a test was given a suspect 
who had previously been interrogated extensively for many days. The lie-detector test 
and the subsequent questioning by the examiner were alleged to have lasted from noon until 
three-thirty the next morning, at which time he confessed. It also appeared that he was 
abused and mistreated by the operator and the police. The confession was held to be 
involuntary and inadmissible. 
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is it barred as "fruit of the poisonous tree"? This latter doctrine, which 
renders inadmissible not only evidence illegally obtained but also any other 
evidence resulting from it, was first applied to evidence obtained by a search 
and seizure illegal under the Fourth Amendment.64 It was later applied to 
evidence obtained by wiretapping.65 But the Supreme Court has refused to 
extend it to confession cases,66 and most state courts permit the prosecution 
to use evidence discovered through the involuntary confession of an accused 
even though the confession itself is inadmissible.67 
Eventually the techniques of narcoanalysis may be so improved or other 
drugs developed so that sufficient reliability will be attained to justify con- 
sideration of the results as evidence of guilt in criminal cases. If and when 
this occurs, what should be the status of confessions or admissions made 
under drug influence to which a suspect has submitted without objection? 
There seems to be no legal reason why they should not be admitted providing 
two cautions are observed. There will be cases, such as those of exception- 
ally ignorant or overly suggestible persons, where submission without the 
advice of competent counsel at the time may be adjudged involuntary not- 
withstanding ostensible consent. And there will be federal cases where, by 
reason of unlawful detention without arraignment at the time of narcoanalysis, 
a confession although otherwise "voluntary" may be adjudged inadmissible 
under the McNabb rule.68 On the other hand, if the suspect is subjected to 
involuntary narcoanalysis over his objection, a resulting confession would 
unquestionably be inadmissible in a federal court because of the rule against 
involuntary confessions. And if a state court admitted such a confession, the 
Supreme Court would surely reverse a conviction as violative of due process.69 
It is true that the traditional reason for excluding an involuntary confession 
is that it is likely to be untrustworthy but recent decisions indicate that 
exclusion is motivated in substantial part by other considerations, particularly 
64. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
65. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). 
66. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947), 33 IOWA L. REV. 136, 26 TEXAS 
L. REV. 536 (first confession, which was not offered, would have been inadmissible be- 
cause obtained during a period of unlawful detention; second confession made after proper 
arraignment held admissible ven though psychologically the fruit of the first); Lyons v. 
Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 1208 (1944) (a second confession made only twelve hours after the 
first was extorted by threats and some violence held admissible). And cf. Malinski v. 
New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1944) where Supreme Court reversed a state court conviction 
because a coerced confession was erroneously admitted in evidence, but refused to rule 
on later confessions. 
67. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE ? 859 (3d ed. 1940); State v. Cocklin, 109 Vt. 207, 194 Atl. 
378 (1937). 
68. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 322 (1943), as interpreted by Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948). 
69. Despres, Legal Aspects of Drug-Induced Statements, 14 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 601, 
605-9 (1946). 
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a desire to discourage the subjection of suspects to police procedures deemed 
inimical to individual privacy.70 
American courts draw a fine distinction between a confession and an ad- 
mission, the former being an express acknowledgment "of the truth of the 
guilty fact charged or of some essential part of it"; the latter being an 
"acknowledgment of a subordinate fact, not directly involving guilt."71 Many 
courts do not require that an admission be shown to have been made volun- 
tarily.72 In these jurisdictions an admission made under involuntary drug 
influence might be received. The potential use of drugs is a compelling 
reason for reexamining the validity of this distinction. If one of the chief 
purposes of the exclusionary rule of coerced confessions is the vindication 
of individual privacy, the restraint of officials disposed to invade privacy, 
and the protection of the judicial power from being employed as an instru- 
ment for lawless enforcement of the criminal law, a distinction between admis- 
sions and confessions is artificial and unrealistic. Thus there is reason for 
profound satisfaction with indications that due process covers both and will 
exclude coerced admissions as well as confessions.73 
Another plausible limitation upon the use of coerced admissions is the 
privilege against self-incrimination. Wigmore has insisted that the privilege 
has no application to investigations by the police.74 Although the rule ex- 
cluding involuntary confessions, as he points out, developed quite independ- 
ently of the privilege against self-incrimination,75 in federal trials the latter 
is sometimes adduced as an alternative ground for exclusion.76 Inasmuch as 
70. E.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (use of stomach pump violates 
due process); People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d 553 (1951) (confession under 
hypnosis inadmissible). 
Also consult, Inbau, The Perversion of Science in Criminal and Personnel Investiga- 
tions, 43 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 128 (1952); McCormick, Some Problems & De- 
velopments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEXAS L. REV. 239, 240-5 (1946). 
See also Allen, The Wolf Case: Search & Seizure, Federalism & the Civil Liberties, 45 
ILL. L. REV. 1 (1950). 
71. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE ? 821 (3d ed. 1940). 
72. Commonwealth v. Haywood, 247 Mass. 161, 141 N.E. 571 (1923), 33 YALE L.J. 
783 (1924); Gorham, Involuntary Admissions Should Not be Competent Evidence, 19 
TEMP. L.Q. 485 (1926). Contra: Gulotta v. United States, 113 F.2d 683, 686 (8th Cir. 
1940) ("If a false confession of guilt may be obtained from an innocent person by the 
use of coercion or flattery it is equally true that an admission of any element of the 
crime may also be obtained by the same means."). Cf. Perovich v. United States, 205 
U.S. 86, 91 (1907) ("[A]s these conversations were not induced by duress, intimidation 
or other improper influences, but were perfectly voluntary, there is no reason why they 
should not have been received."). 
73. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274 
(1946). 
74. 8 WIGMORE, VIDENCE ? 2266 (3d ed. 1940). 
75. Brown v. Mississippi 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Morgan, The Privilege Against Self- 
Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1, 27-30 (1949). 
76. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) ("In criminal trials in the 
courts of the United States wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompe- 
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evidence obtained from a person under the influence of drugs, if offered as 
an admission, is of a testimonial character the privilege-if used to bar con- 
fessions-should apply here as well.77 
If a defendant proposes to testify on his own behalf at trial, should sub- 
mission to a narcoanalysis experiment ever be required as a condition, with 
an understanding that the results may be used for or against him depending 
on the outcome? At common law a defendant in a criminal prosecution was 
not a competent witness in his own behalf. Only within the past one hundred 
years has the disability been removed. Now, while a defendant cannot be 
compelled to be a witness, he is, if he so desires, entitled to be sworn as a 
witness and to testify in his own behalf.78 It is arguable that if competency 
to testify is a creature of statutes, conditions can be attached to the privilege 
of testifying. To make narcoanalysis a prerequisite, however, would be inde- 
fensible. By taking the stand and testifying in his own behalf a defendant 
does, to be sure, waive his privilege against answering incriminating ques- 
tions under oath. The waiver rule, however, contemplates a defendant who 
is conscious and in possession of his faculties, with benefit of counsel to 
protect him from inadmissible forms of cross-examination and to repair mis- 
leading impressions produced on cross-examination by further questioning 
on re-direct examination. The only form of coercion authorized as a conse- 
quence of waiver has been the power of the court to order the defendant to 
answer proper cross-examination under penalty of having his direct testimony 
stricken and being held in contempt. 
Suppose that defendant has already put in evidence the results of a narco- 
analytic experiment conducted at his own instigation? Should he then be 
tent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amend- 
ment to the Constitution of the United States commanding that no person shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."); United States v. 
Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 41 (1951) ("Whether involuntary confessions are excluded from 
federal criminal trials on the ground of a violation of the Fifth Amendment's protection 
against self-incrimination, or from a rule that forced confessions are untrustworthy, these 
uncontradicted facts do not bar this confession as a matter of law."); and also see Up- 
shaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 417 (1948) ("A prisoner's constitutional rights 
against self-incrimination or to due process are protected by the rule that no involuntary 
confession may be admitted.") (dissenting opinion). 
This ground of exclusion would preclude, however, federal supervision of state court 
practices. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). Also see concurring opinions of 
Justices Black and Douglas in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
77. It is arguable that narcoanalysis is analagous to blood tests, intoxication tests, 
fingerprinting, psychiatric examinations for insanity, medical examinations for pregnancy 
and disease, etc., and that the results are not offered testimonially. 8 WIGMORE, EVI- 
DENCE ? 2265 (3d ed. 1940). This has been suggested with respect to the lie-detector. 
INBAU, SELF-INCRIMINATION 67 (1950). But with the lie-dector neither the physio- 
logical reactions nor the "yes" and "no" answers are used testimonially; indeed the verbal 
answers may be dispensed with without materially affecting the results. When the results 
of narcoanalysis are offered as admissions they would be offered testimonially. 
78. 2 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE ? 579 (3d ed. 1940). 
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considered to have opened the door fully to a second narcoanalytic experi- 
ment pursuant to court order? In the absence of precedent the answer can 
only be speculative, but it is conceivable that a court might so hold.79 
Material Witnesses 
Judicial resort to psychiatric examination and other scientific procedures 
for testing the veracity of key material witnesses in order to avert miscar- 
riages of justice in criminal proceedings offers intriguing possibilities.80 It is 
elementary that a witness to be competent must have a minimal capacity to 
observe, recollect, and narrate. At the voir dire examination on the question 
of competency, the judge is not bound by the ordinary rules of evidence and 
has full discretion to use any available aids, such as mental and psychological 
tests.81 The modern tendency is to permit a mentally disordered witness to 
testify at trial, leaving the defect in question to have whatever weight it 
deserves as discrediting his powers of observation, recollection, or communica- 
tion.82 This relaxation of competency requirements has increased the need 
for psychiatric evaluation of a personality-disordered key witness. Judicial 
obstructionism has taken two different forms. First, some courts, applying 
the traditional methods of character impeachment, have limited evidence to 
the reputation of the witness as evidenced by community judgment 83 or, in 
a few jurisdictions, to particular instances of misconduct.84 But these methods, 
which have no bearing on defective organic capacity or personality structure, 
should not limit the use of expert testimony in evaluating the testimony of a 
witness.85 Second, other courts apply these restrictions only when expert 
diagnosis of the lesser mental illnesses is offered to discredit, but 
79. A Wisconsin statute providing that "no testimony regarding the mental condi- 
tion of the accused shall be received from witnesses summoned by the accused until the 
expert witnesses summoned by the prosecution have been given an opportunity to examine 
and observe the accused, if such opportunity shall have been seasonably demanded" has 
been held constitutional. Jessner v. State, 202 Wis. 184, 231 N.W. 634 (1930), 26 ILL. 
L. REV. 82 (1931), [1931] Wis. L. REV. 184, 40 YALE L.J. 667 (1931). 
80. See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE ?? 931-5, 997-9 (3d ed. 1940). 
81. 2 id. ?? 492-501; Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evi- 
dence-The Competency of Witnesses, 37 YALE L.J. 1017, 1019 (1928). 
82. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE ?? 501, 931 (3d ed. 1940). 
83. E.g., State v. Driver, 88 W.Va. 479, 107 S.E. 189 (1921). 
84. 3 WIGMORE, VIDENCE ? 979 (3d ed. 1940). 
85. Id. at ? 931: 
"Since the theory of this evidence is that any defect of capacity, 
insufficient to exclude, and yet involving less than the normal testi- 
monial capacity, should legitimately discredit the witness, carrying 
whatever weight it may have in a given case, the only proper 
limit upon such evidence would seem to .be as follows: Any trait 
importing in itself a defective power of observation (at the time of 
the matter testified to), or of recollection, or of communication, 
is admissible, provided the power is substantially defective as judged 
by the average standard of mentality." 
Consult also State v. Armstrong, 232 N.C. 727, 62 S.E.2d 50 (1950), where the 
only eye-witness to a killing was a girl who would have been described by a doctor who 
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admit evidence of extreme mental derangement verging on psychosis.86 
Contrariwise, many have come to realize that psychiatry can render 
valuable assistance in assessing the lesser mental disorders. Recogni- 
tion has been most pronounced in sex offense cases where the courts 
have permitted psychiatrists to expose mental deficiencies, hysteria, 
and pathological lying in complaining witnesses. 87 And some courts permit 
evidence that a witness uses drugs either to show organic impairment of 
testimonial powers or a propensity to lie.88 There is also the recent example 
of the hypothetical psychiatric testimony introduced by the defense to impeach 
the witness Chambers in the trial of Alger Hiss in the Southern District of 
New York. The psychiatrist was permitted to testify that in his opinion 
the witness was a psychopathic personality with "a tendency towards making 
false accusations."89 
had tended her-had he been allowed to testify-as "a low-class moron, equivalent of a 
nine-year-old child." In holding it reversible error not to let the doctor so testify, 
Chief Justice Stacy said: 
"It is always open to a defendant to challenge the credibility of 
the witnesses offered by the prosecution who testify against him.... 
"What could be more effective for the purpose than to impeach 
the mentality or the intellectual grasp of the witness? If his inter- 
est, bias, indelicate way of life, insobriety and general bad reputation 
in the community may be shown as bearing upon his unworthiness 
of belief, why not his imbecility, want of understanding, or moronic 
comprehension, which go more directly to the point? . . . That 
which may be shown indirectly may also be shown directly. The 
law favors directness over indirectness; simplicity over complexity; 
brevity over prolixity; clarity over obscurity; substance over form. 
There is no virtue in the long phrase when a short one will do just 
as well. The court-room is not the home of redundancy or circum- 
locution. Conciseness is the keynote there." 
Id. at 728-9, 62 S.E.2d at 51. 
86. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE ? 932 (3d ed. 1940). And see State v. Driver, 88 W. Va. 
479, 107 S.E. 189 (1921). 
87. See Comment, Psychiatric Testimony for the Impeachment of Witnesses in Sex 
Cases, 39 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 750 (1949); and Note, 26 IND. L.J. 98 (1950). 
In 1938, the American Bar Association's Committee on the Improvement of the Law 
of Evidence recommended that "in all charges of sex offenses, the complaining witness 
be required to be examined before trial by competent psychiatrists for the purpose of 
ascertaining her probable credibility, the report to be presented in evidence." 3 WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE ? 924a (3d ed. 1940). 
88. Note, 16 So. CALIF. L. REv. 333 (1943) ; 3 WIGMORE, VIDENCE ? 934 (3d ed. 
1940). 
89. See United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559, 560 (1950), aff'd, 185 F.2d 822 (2d 
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951) (District Judge Goddard, in discussing the 
problem of admissibility, said: "The existence of insanity or mental derangement is 
admissible for the purpose of discrediting a witness. Evidence of insanity is not merely 
for the judge on the preliminary question of competency but goes to the jury to affect 
credibility.") 
See also Comment, Psychiatric Evaluation of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59 
YALE L.J. 1324 (1950). 
For a perceptive and critical appraisal of the psychiatric testimony in the Hiss case, 
see Roche, Truth Telling, Psychiatric Expert Testimony and the Impeachment of Wit- 
nesses, 22 PA. BAR Ass'N Q. 140 (1951). 
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Admittedly, the dividing line between truth and untruth is a shadowy one. 
It is debatable whether psychology and psychiatry have progressed to the 
point where they are able (with or without narcoanalysis) to establish the 
truth or falsity of testimony. A recent appraisal is as follows: 
"Admittedly, categorical opinions about the truth of evidence can 
be given only rarely. And in simple, uncomplicated situations little 
or no assistance could be expected. But with the more complex 
problems, which involve the uncontrolled fantasy formation and sug- 
gestibility of childhood, the suggestibility and unreliability of the 
intellectually defective and the demented, the hallucinations and de- 
lusions of the psychotic, the irresponsibility of the true psychopath, 
the confabulations of patients with organic brain disorders, and the 
unreliability of hysterics, real help could often be obtained."9? 
And it may be added that here as well as when insanity is the issue, narco- 
analysis accompanying a complete and thorough examination is an important 
and valuable diagnostic adjunct. 
If a witness agrees to submit to narcoanalysis the problem for the court is 
about the same as that posed by a defense offer of a voluntary narcoanalytic 
experiment on the defendant. If the witness does not consent several diffi- 
culties arise. The full potentialities of psychiatric evaluation can not be 
realized unless the diagnosis is based upon a full clinical examination. There- 
fore, to provide juries or courts with maximum psychiatric assistance there 
should be a clinical examination by a court-appointed psychiatrist upon a 
reasonable showing that a key material witness may be suffering from a 
mental illness likely to affect his credibility. Do courts have this power? If 
the competency of a witness is attacked, the judge certainly has power to 
appoint psychiatrists to examine the witness. His authority to do so stems 
either from his inherent power to summon witnesses 91 or from statutes or 
rules confirming his authority to call experts.92 The voir dire may thus serve 
as a procedural device for obtaining a clinical diagnosis which will later be 
available for impeachment purposes.93 But suppose the court finds a witness 
competent without clinical psychiatric examination; is there any way to get 
a clinicial examination where impeachment is the objective? Although it is 
doubtful whether a court has power to order a psychiatric examination for 
impeachment purposes alone, the court may be willing to accomplish this 
result by invoking its power to determine competency, even though the witness 
90. GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 365 (1952). 
91. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE ? 563 (3d ed. 1940). 
92. Ibid., collecting and summarizing the statutes and court rules. Exercising these 
powers, trial judges have appointed psychiatrists to examine witnesses whose competency 
was questioned by opposing counsel. People v. Hudson, 341 I11. 187, 173 N.E. 278 
(1930); Commonwealth v. Koch, 305 Pa. 146, 157 Atl. 479 (1931). And in Goodwin v. 
State, 114 Wis. 318, 321, 90 N.W. 170, 171 (1902), the court stated that examination 
could be imposed as a condition precedent to testifying where the court is seriously 
doubtful of a witness' mental competency. 
93. People v. Hudson, 341 Ill. 187, 173 N.E. 278 (1930), and note 87 supra. 
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has taken the stand and even though the court remains convinced that the 
witness is competent.94 
If a court can order clinical examination of a witness, can the witness be 
required, as part of the examination, to undergo narcoanalysis? This, of 
course, raises problems of self-incrimination and the physician-patient privilege 
which are substantially the same as those already discussed in connection 
with the compulsory examination of defendants.95 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Conducted under properly controlled conditions by a qualified psychiatrist 
with experience in its use, an interview in which the subject is partially under 
the influence of a drug (such as the barbiturates) may be a proper and 
valuable auxiliary procedure in a thorough diagnostic examination. The be- 
94. In State v. Palmer, 206 Minn. 185, 288 N.W. 160 (1939), psychiatric examina- 
tion was allowed after the witness left the stand. The diagnosis based on this examina- 
tion was then used to impeach the witness. Contra: Goodwin v. State, 114 Wis. 318, 90 
N.W. 170 (1902). 
There may be cases where a diagnosis is already available because the witness has 
had psychiatric treatment either privately or in a mental hospital or clinic. If narco- 
analysis was a part of the diagnosis this should not prevent its use. Of course, the 
physician-patient privilege might prevent the use of such a diagnosis. 
95. To permit either party to compel all his opponent's witnesses to submit to 
narcoanalysis might well lead to intolerable confusion and delay unless the technique is 
developed, refined, and simplified far beyond present expectations. In State v. Cole, 354 
Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43, rehearing denied, 189 S.W.2d 541 (1945), the defendant made 
a motion at the beginning of the trial for a court order requiring all witnesses in the 
case to be required to give their testimony while strapped to a lie-detector. In holding 
that the trial court properly denied the motion the Missouri Supreme Court stated: 
"In our opinion the day has not come when all the witnesses 
in a case can be subjected to such inquisitorial and deceptive tests 
(or to drugs like scopolamine, or to hypnotism) without their con- 
sent. Furthermore, such dramatics before the jury would distract 
them and impede the trial-this latter also because it is necessary for 
the inquisitor to ask both harmless, irrelevant and 'hot' questions in 
order to bring out the contrast in the witness' emotional responses. 
No doubt the lie-detector is useful in the investigation of crime, 
and may point to evidence which is competent; but it has no place 
in the court room." Id. at 193, 188 S.W.2d at 51. 
If narcoanalytic techniques are developed to the stage where the results are reliable 
as "truth" there would be no necessity to test persons other than the principals. A test 
of them would usually provide a full and complete answer to the legal inquiry. 
And in State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 627-8, 185 P.2d 147, 151 (1947), where the 
trial court had suggested that both the complaining witness and the defendant submit to 
a lie-detector, the Kansas Supreme Court indicated that it would be more reluctant to 
admit the test results on a witness than on a defendant: 
"Consider the situation in the instant case. Two men were 
involved. One was a defendant on trial. The other was merely a 
witness and under no such emotional strain. Can it be said that 
with such wholly different mental states existing, the tests would be 
equally fair? Must the jury be asked to consider and weigh such 
intangible and elusive elements?" 
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havior manifested under drug influence varies with the physiological tolerance 
of the subject, his personality structure, his "set" or attitude at that time, 
and the immediate stimuli impinging upon him. Generally, relaxation is 
facilitated, verbalization is less inhibited, and there is freer expression of fact 
-as well as of fancy and suggestion. In some cases correct information may 
be withheld or distorted and, in others, erroneous data elicited through sug- 
gestion. Nevertheless, narcoanalysis when correctly used may enable the 
psychiatrist to probe more deeply and quickly into the psychological character- 
istics of the subject. For these reasons, the results should not be regarded 
by the psychiatrist as "truth" but simply as clinical data to be integrated 
with and interpreted in the light of what is known concerning the dynamics 
of the subject's conflictual anxieties, motivations, and behavioral tendencies. 
Thus the bare results of an interview under the influence of drugs should 
not, standing alone, be considered a valid and reliable indicator of the facts. 
As a sole procedure, narcoanalysis is not sufficiently reliable. And where the 
drug-induced interview is a primary procedure and an otherwise full ex- 
amination of the subject's personality structure is lacking, the results should 
not be considered; narcoanalysis should only be used as an adjunctive or 
auxiliary technique. On the other hand, when the subject has submitted 
voluntarily, after advice of counsel, to a thorough examination by a psychia- 
trist of his own choosing, the psychiatrist should be permitted to take the 
results of a drug-induced interview into account as data in forming an 
opinion about the subject's mental condition and personality structure. So 
limited, the results have acquired enough reliability in the field of medical 
psychology to be recognized as bases for an expert opinion. And where the 
subject has submitted voluntarily there is no question of self-incrimination 
or the physician-patient privilege, and the hearsay rule is inapplicable. 
Under no circumstances should a suspect or material witness undergo 
narcoanalysis while in police custody unless he has consulted counsel of his 
own choice, thereafter competently and intelligently consented, and counsel is 
permitted to be present at the interview. Otherwise the dangers of abuse 
and violation of individual privacy while in police custody are so great as to 
overcome the usual counter arguments that police investigation will unduly 
be hampered. For the uncounseled person in police custody, the line between 
voluntary and involuntary submission is so tenuous as to be incapable of 
administration. 
To protect a suspect or witness from drug interrogation while in police 
custody the courts should devise controls such as the following: 
1. Discard the dichotomy between involuntary admissions and involuntary 
confessions and declare both inadmissible. 
2. Recognize and apply the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to 
prevent the use of drugs to obtain clues and leads. 
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If a court thinks it advisable in a situation where the law so permits to 
order a defendant or key witness to submit to a full psychiatric examination, 
the psychiatrist should be permitted to use narcoanalysis. However, he should 
be required, if he finds that a drug interview would aid his diagnosis, to 
obtain a specific court order authorizing narcoanalysis.96 And the court 
should authorize this procedure only if convinced that the defendant or key 
witness is willing to submit or-in the case of a defendant-has waived as in 
the Esposito case.97 
We have suggested that circumstances may justify narcoanalytic examina- 
tion of a key material witness in a criminal proceeding. And by criminal 
proceeding we mean any proceeding-whether judicial, executive, or adminis- 
trative-where severe sanctions that are "punitive" in fact may be imposed. 
But the possibility of impeaching as well as corroborating witnesses, other than 
key witnesses in criminal proceedings, by the method under discussion raises 
delicate policy questions. Should every witness who appears in any type of 
proceeding-however inconsequential the proceeding or the impact of his 
testimony from the point of view of the community at large-face this type of 
invasion of his privacy? Presumably not, according to Anglo-American 
tradition; and if this tradition is worth retaining, what are the appropriate 
limiting criteria? This question is but a part-perhaps one of the more acute 
parts-of the larger problem of the conditions under which character impeach- 
ment and psychiatric impeachment or disqualification of a non-key witness 
should be permitted. The question obtrudes itself here, but we feel that its 
attempted resolution requires an exploration of other issues and other con- 
siderations in a broader context than that of narcoanalysis alone. 
A "transcript" of drug-induced material may take the form of a recording, 
a stenographic report of the interview, or the testimony of the interviewing 
psychiatrist or anyone else who was present. To what extent should the 
transcript's disclosure be permitted in the specific proceeding in connection 
with which narcoanalysis occurred? If the narcoanlysis was not lawfully 
ordered or if the subject did not voluntarily submit, any disclosure without 
the subject's consent or request (as, for example, if he sought it by way of 
discovery before trial or on cross-examination of the psychiatrist) should 
be deemed a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. On the other 
hand, if the subject voluntarily submitted to narcoanalysis or if it was con- 
ducted pursuant to court order, the court should permit only such disclosure 
as it considers necessary to permit a fair testing of the psychiatrist's opinion 
by cross-examining counsel. 
Drug-induced statements may reveal many matters-including other crimes 
or indiscretions-not germane to the proceeding in which the narcoanalysis 
took place. What of the use of these statements in other proceedings? What 
96. This suggestion for a specific court order has been made in de Vabres, French 
Justice and the Use of Pentothal, 4 INT'L CRIM. POLICE REV. (ENG. ED.) 2, 9 (1949). 97. See pages 329-30 supra. 
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has already been said of the unreliability of statements made under narco- 
analysis, whether self-serving or disserving on their face, suggests not only 
that they should be inadmissible as independent evidence in the original pro- 
ceeding, but a fortiori should not be admissible in other proceedings brought 
for other purposes. And the contempt power and an adjustment of the law 
governing libel and slander should also be considered as devices for controlling 
the subsequent use of drug-induced statements disclosed in the original 
proceeding. 
As the use of narcoanalysis becomes more general and its potentialities 
more widely understood, we shall be faced with additional problems: should 
comment on and the drawing of any adverse inferences from the failure of 
an accused to submit to narcoanalysis be permitted or effectively prohibited; 
and, if comment and inference are permitted, should they be restricted to 
certain types of proceedings? The issue, of course, arises and will arise only 
in regard to suspects who are already in the community's clutches and subject 
to its array of investigative procedures and resources. We can but express 
the hope that the day may never arrive when the community will feel so 
impotent vis a vis suspects as to permit this type of comment and inference.98 
Concentration on judicial recognition and control of narcoanalysis should 
not mask the urgent fact-true here as elsewhere in criminal law and admini- 
stration-that officials operating at the police or investigative level must be 
sensitive to, and aware of, the disturbing challenges posed by developments 
in the use of drugs. By modernizing the rules of evidence the courts can 
accord recognition to advances in medical science, although some lag is to be 
expected and perhaps to be desired. And, though recognized, the use of 
drugs can be controlled so as to preclude judicial tolerance of possible abuses 
-misinterpretation of drug-induced statements and invasions of privacy 
through involuntary narcoanalysis. But criminal investigators and prose- 
cutors are in a position to stigmatize this procedure if they abuse it. They 
are also in a position, if overzealous or misinformed, to escape judicial 
restraints by extra-judicial coercion of suspects or by basing crucial admini- 
strative decisions on the results of improper drug administration. Those 
whose business it is to participate in the infliction of criminal sanctions may 
find narcoanalysis a helpful adjunct, an adjunct, however, which must be 
both mastered and controlled if we are to honor our belief in the dignity of 
the individual. 
98. Shortly after these sanguine words were written the New York Court of Appeals 
refused, without opinion, to reverse a conviction of first degree murder where the prosecutor 
had implied in his summation that the refusal of defendant to take truth serum was evidence 
of his guilt. People v. Draper, 304 N.Y. 799, 109 N.E.2d 342 (1952) (Loughran, C. J., and 
Froessel, J., dissenting). Since the defendant interposed insanity as a defense, the court 
may have been relying upon the waiver theory of the Esposito case, supra note 44. But there 
the court limited waiver to the question of insanity and expressly did not extend it to the 
issue of guilt. 
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APPENDIX 
USE OF NARCOANALYSIS AT MENLO PARK (N.J.) DIAGNOSTIC CENTER 
The following statement provides a valuable description and analysis 
of the use of narcoanalysis in the correction process. It was contained 
in a letter written to the authors by Ralph Brancale, M.D., Director 
of the Menlo Park Diagnostic Center, which assists New Jersey courts, 
correctional institutions, and social agencies by diagnosing persons 
referred to it for examination. The statement is reproduced here with 
Dr. Brancale's permission. 
Since the inception of our work at Menlo Park we have made extensive 
use of both narco and hypnoanalytic techniques to aid us in the correct psychi- 
atric evaluation of our cases. There has been, within recent years, considerable 
progress made in the clinical insight into anti-social personality patterns so 
that our present approach veers from the old static descriptive classification 
attitude to one vitally interested in the dynamic and genetic development of 
the "psychopathic reaction." We are forced to the conclusion that the repetitive 
delinquent and repetitive adult offender is suffering from a complex and chronic 
neurotic reaction. The symptoms expressed in his anti-social behavior are 
understandable only in terms of deeply repressed and obscure motivations. 
We learn, too, that these repressed instinctive needs may undergo all types 
of displacements, distortions, and symbolizations in their attempt to seek ex- 
pression. Hence the process of understanding the offender is dependent upon 
the extent that we are able to uncover the underlying repressed emotional 
charges and visualizing their pathological distribution in symptom formation. 
We are more than ever convinced that a great number of offenders are com- 
pulsives pressured by neurotic needs. 
Analytical investigation of the unconscious trends has been hampered by 
the characteristic rigidity of the personality of the offender, a rigidity which 
makes him relatively unresponsive to verbal analysis-part of this is due to 
the painful nature of the conflicts and the chronicity of the repressive defenses. 
While at Elmira Reformatory I happened to use both amytal and hypnosis 
and was surprised to obtain quickly and easily psychological content which 
I was not able to obtain by verbal interviewing method. I felt that the ad- 
vantages of Deep Dissociating techniques were so great that they should be 
routinely employed. 
Values of amytal interviews: 
1. Quicker understanding of underlying dynamics of the anti-social process; 
2. Point up the nature and severity of the personality disorder; 
3. Give a good idea of responsiveness or lack of responsiveness to treatment; 
4. Have a distinct therapeutic effect; 
5. Speed up diagnostic and treatment process. 
At our Diagnostic Center over 90 percent of our in-patient population (age 10 to 18) undergo amytal interviews unless contra-indicated for medical 
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reasons. This narcosis interview is arranged with the consent of the guardian 
or parent. No amytal is given without written consent. Patient first under- 
goes medical, psychological, and social work investigation. Following psychi- 
atric interviews he then undergoes an amytal examination (drug administered 
intravenously-average dose 7Y2 grains). 
Narcoanalysis is equally, if not more valuable in dealing with adult offenders. 
These are seen on an out-patient basis. Adult offenders may be- 
1. Referred from the courts-pre-trial; 
2. Referred from the courts-pre-sentence; 
3. Referred under sex statute (mandatory for all sex cases to be seen 
at Center following conviction); 
4. Referred from our correctional institutions-pre-parole. 
The material gained through amytal interviews of adults may throw an alto- 
gether different light on the case analysis. Unfortunately, time and convenience 
does not permit sodium amytal interview as a routine on out-patient cases. 
I believe it should be stressed that sodium amytal is not a truth-eliciting 
device. There are offenders who are able to cover up guilt even under deepest 
narcosis. The depth of narcosis, however, is an important consideration. 
While psychological material obtained under medication is usually valid, it 
is still possible for individuals to phantasize. This is especially true of patho- 
logical types with poorly differentiated ego structure, where the line between 
reality and phantasy remains extremely thin. In such cases great care must 
be exercised to avoid mistaking an unconscious phantasy for real experiences. 
At the Diagnostic Center it is necessary to interpret to the offender the 
usefulness of this technique and to assure him that it is not used for "truth 
gathering" purposes, but primarily for purposes of insight and therapy. When 
the full picture is interpreted to the court, disposition is prone to be more 
equitable and considerate. In our experience offenders do not seem to resent 
this procedure. 
I should add that not all patients are productive with the sodium amytal 
hypnosis. We have a fairly good percentage who develop non-productive 
reactions or sleep reactions. Secondly, the usefulness of an amytal interview 
is also dependent upon the patience and skill of, and the time taken by, the 
therapist; and the process and technique of ventilation employed is as important 
as any other factor in the use of this drug. I should mention also that a new 
drug has been recently employed in our institution and in other psychiatric 
centers. This drug, methedrine, essentially a cortical stimulant, seems also 
to produce a cathartic, talkative response on the part of the patient. We fre- 
quently find that in cases which are non-productive with amytal, the administra- 
tion of a small amount of methedrine intravenously may give us some very 
desirable effects. The drugs can produce a cathartic, talkative response without 
amytal. In some cases the reactions are quite dramatic. We are not clear at 
this moment whether the value of methedrine is superior to that of amytal; 
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we are inclined to feel that amytal has a greater therapeutic effect than this 
latter drug. Methedrine, we feel, is a very important addition to the use of 
narcoanalysis. 
I would like to touch briefly on the pre-trial case. We are receiving an 
increasing number of such referrals, both from the courts and from the 
patient's attorney, to do amytal studies pre-trial. This puts us in a serious 
dilemma because, as psychiatrists, we try to avoid the issue of guilt and inno- 
cence. Nevertheless we have had occasions to use such interviews prior to 
trial. On one occasion consent was obtained from the prosecutor, the trial 
judge; the defense attorney, and the patient. Interestingly enough, the patient 
gave us material which would have resulted in a very long sentence. He also 
poured out psychological factors that gave us greater insight and afforded some 
possibility of some form of treatment. It was thus possible in this case to 
compromise the extreme demands of the prosecutor, on one hand, and the ex- 
onerating demands of the defendant's attorney, on the other, to the advantage 
both to the offender and society. However, as a rule in pre-trial cases we 
prefer to limit ourselves to the question of mental responsibility and the 
capacity of the patient to stand trial. 
We are using amytal on institutional cases pre-parole, especially those with 
history of assault and homicidal trends. Amytal in certain cases releases the 
latent aggression and affords us a better idea of the potentialities of a given 
case. 
In our hands the use of narcoanalysis is a very important technique and 
extremely useful from the diagnostic, prognostic, and therapeutic standpoint. 
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